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ABSTRACT
A citizen group advocating energy conservation on
Martha's Vineyard was the client. The goal was to deter-
mine a policy for promoting home weatherization in order
to reduce the demand for home heating fuels and the re-
sultant drain from the Island economy.
A model of the prototypical dwelling units in New
England was modified to predict the benefits to the
Vineyard homeowner from different levels of weatheriza-
tion investment. This was used in conjunction with an
analysis of to what extent weatherizing should be pro-
moted and to decide what policies might cause the year-
round Vineyarders to further weatherize.
With no outside resources, the local Island govern-
ments may only be able to adopt a policy to inform Vine-
yarders of the benefits to weatherization. However, the
results of the investment model show that the rate of
return an Island homeowner can expect from additional
investment is lower than generally expected by the New
England household. A plan to inform Vineyarders is less
likely to promote more weatherization than similar pro-
grams in other areas because Islanders are already aware
of the benefits.
If the resources are-available, then a rebate pro-
gram would be most likely to induce further weatheriza-
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tion. It significantly lowers the cost to the consumer
and targets a group of homeowners'who may be missed by
the existing set of programs to promote residential
energy conservation. Although the program will have an
expansionary impact, the effect will be slight. The
expansionary effect will increase as energy prices rise
more quickly than other prices and as the export percen-
tage of a dollar spent on energy rises.
Thesis Supervisor: Richard D. Tabors
. Title: Principal Research Associate
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction and Problem Statement
The Energy Resource Group of Martha's Vineyard (ERG)
is a non-profit citizens organization formed in the fall
of 1976. Island residents created ERG because they per-
ceived a lack of accessible information about energy
alternatives. Besides conducting workshops and demonstra-
tions and providing information to the general public, ERG
has sought to influence policy decisions. Woodlot manage-
ment, zoning for windmills, and establishment of an energy
planning office for Dukes County are all areas where ERG
has affected public policy.
The goal of this thesis is to perform a policy anal-
ysis in order to suggest the best method for promoting
weatherization on Martha's Vineyard. Chapters Two and
Three are a discussion of the major factors affecting con-
sumers' decisions to weatherize, the rationales for govern-
ment intervention, and existing policies to promote the
investments. 4
An evaluation of the success of the policies is com-
bined with a characterization of the political, social
and economic constraints on Vineyard governments. Policy
recommendations are the end result.
The Appendix to the thesis includes a description of
-7-
REFORM, a model of the impacts of weatherization on the
energy demanded for home heating. The model shows the
returns a homeowner can expect on his investment. This
information is used as a guide to what factors are likely
to be most important in the decision to weatherize and
hence to test the probable effectiveness of the initial
recommendation.
A revised policy is presented in Chapter Four. Then,
the costs and benefits of this program on the overall
Island economy are calculated.
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CHAPTER 2
Factors Affecting Consumers' Decisions to Weatherize
What follows is a description of the major factors
affecting consumers' decisions to invest in weatherization.
Examples of government policies which seek to stimulate
weatherization through changes in each of the factors are
also included.
2.1 Information:
There is the possibility that consumers are unaware
of the benefits to weatherization. Homeowners simply may
not realize that insulation and other measures will signi-
ficantly reduce their energy consumption and at a cost
which will still leave them with considerable energy sav-
ings.
ERG was originally founded in response to the percep-
tion that consumers are unaware of these benefits. The
organization provides Islanders with access to information
about energy alternatives and conservation. The federal
government is in part responding to the same perception
with the Residential Energy Conservation Service . The
program, administered by the state energy offices, is
lMassachusetts Residential Conservation Program, Executive
Office of.Energy Resources, June, 1980.
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scheduled to begin this fall when utility customers will
be given energy audits upon request and payment of a $15
fee. The fee may be waived for low-income customers. The
utility will conduct the audit, provide assistance in
locating reliable contractors, and help arrange financing.
The RCS is an effort to market weatherization and
energy conservation in general. If the energy auditor is
a good salesperson, he or she will convince the homeowner
to weatherize. There are two problems with the program.
The first is a tendency to regard the auditor with dis-
trust. He is offering advice on what can be done to re-
duce energy consumption and who could be hired to make
the necessary repairs, installations, etc. He is even
offering to help find financing. The consumer may ques-
tion what the reward to the auditor is. Have any of the
possible contractors or financers attempted to influence
the auditor? There exists a policing mechanism in the RCS
program but consumers may still be skeptical of informa-
tion presented by the auditors. The tendency to disbe-
lieve may be strengthened because the auditor could be
seen as a representative of the utility. In that case,
consumers may question the seller of a product (conserva-
tion) which will diminish the demand for his employer's
product (electricity).
The second problem with RCS in Massachusetts is that
-10-
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utilities already have excess capacity and therefore
little incentive to promote the program. It will lead to
reduced residential demand for electricity, lower receipts,
and more excess capacity.
2.2 Lack of Financing
Lack of financing is a problem for low income house-
holds who want to weatherize. The necessary funds may be
completely unavailable from private sources or too costly.
Under the rationale that rising energy prices have caused
hardship because people cannot afford to make the weather-
ization improvements, the federal government established
a program (National Energy Conservation Policy Act 3) to
provide grants to low income families. Income may be no
more than 125 percent of the federally established poverty
level. The maximum grant is $1000 for the purchase of and
installation of eligible weatherization materials. The
amount may be increased up to $1600 by the regional Repre-
sentative to reduce severe shortages of labor. The pro-
gram is funded through the Department of Energy which in
2 Conversation with Andy McGill, Massachusetts Executive
Office of Energy Resources. Also, Wall Street Journal,
"Many Electric Utilities Suffer as Conservation Holds
Down Demand," Philip W. Shenon, October 9, 1980.
3National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Weatherization
Grants for Low-Income Families, Office of Weatherization
Assistance, Department of Energy, Washington, DC.
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turn funds the Community Action Pltogram (CAP) in donjunc-
tion with the Community Service Administration.
The winterization effort in Wareham, Massachusetts
4
is one example of the implementation of the federal pro-
gram. Materials are bought with Department of Energy
funds which are channeled through the Housing Assistance
Corporation in Hyannis, Massachusetts. The Housing Assis-
tance Corporation is part of CAP.
Wareham's program began in April 1976. At that time
CETA workers installed the weatherization measures. They
included attic and wall insulation, weatherstripping,
caulking, storm windows and doors, insulation of hot water
pipes, heating ducts and water tanks, installing attic
vents, replacing broken windows, and installing insulating
gaskets on electric switches and receptacles. The spend-
ing limit on materials was $125 - $250. The program has
since been revised. Community Development Block Grant
funds are used to support the services of one carpenter
in addition to the CETA workers. The spending limit on
materials has been'raised to $1000. Since 1976, approxi-
mately 330 houses have been serviced. No statistics were
available on energy savings or cost to the town of waiting
4
James 0. Brandolini, Community Development Department,
Housing Rehabilitation, Town of Wareham, Massachusetts,
WeatherizAtion Program.
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period between the time weatherization was requested and
when it was obtained. The current crew of three workers
is able to weatherize three to four homes per week.
There are programs similar to Wareham's throughout
New England. A study undertaken by the New England Com-
munity Action Program Directors Association (NECAPDA )
provides more general information to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of grant programs in achieving weatherization.
The program is aimed at reducing the regressive
impact of higher energy prices. Eligibility is deter-
mined by income rather than by the condition of the hous-
ing, the goal being to provide financing to those who do
not weatherize because they lack the funds. According
to the NECAPDA, this goal is achieved. Eighty-six percent
of the homes weatherized by the program are occupied by
persons in families with income below the federal poverty
level.
The economic efficiency (rate of return per dollar
spent) of the program is more difficult to evaluate. To
the extent that the units winterized are in need of more
repairs than average because it is more difficult for
owners to pay upkeep, the program targets the houses with
5 New England Community Action Program Directors Associa-
tion, Report of Weatherization Program, Boston, Massachu-
setts, February, 1979.
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the greatest possible rate of return. NECAPDA's survey
shows 90 percent of the units benefiting from the program
were in need of significant repairs using the DOE method
to calculate heat savings based on reports from Community
Action agencies, "weatherized homes throughout New England
stood to benefit an average of $400 in fuel savings in the
first year"6 after the investment. That is, actual sav-
ings are unknown but are expected to be significant.
Criticisms of the program center on the lack of local
control and the complex array of federal agencies involved.
Sixty-four percent of the community action agencies con-
tacted would prefer increased flexibility. Among rural
and small urban agencies, 87.5 percent prefer more flexi-
bility to accomodate local conditions. The lack of local
decision making power led to a situation in Wareham where
weatherization was slowed. DOE funds could only be used
for materials when installation was the greater cost.
Materials could be purchased but not installed.
2.3 Consumer Choice
Consumers may understand the benefits to weatheriza-
tion, be able to afford it, and still not choose to make
the investment. Weatherization is expensive, and if it
-14-
6 1bid., Section C.
costs more to invest than it does to pay the heating bill
even for one year, consumers are not likely to weatherize.
Also, there is no guarantee that savings will be what they
are projected to be. Given this risk or perceived risk,
the rational consumer may discount the energy savings at
a very high rate and decide against the investment.
There are at least two other reasons why consumers
may choose not to weatherize. Energy Future , the report
of the Harvard Business School, cites the mobility of the
average household as a factor. "By 1970, only 54 percent
of all househould heads were living in the same houses as
1965. If you think you are going to move in a couple of
years, why invest?" The consumer in this case may under-
stand the benefits to weatherization and accept them but
calculates that the investment easily may not be recovered
by the time he moves. Even if the improvement adds to
the value of the home so that it is recouped in the sale,
the consumer may earn a better return by putting his money
in a money market fund.
Perhaps the most common reason for not weatherizing
is that there are many no cost/low cost ways of reducing
energy consumption. The return on these is infinite since
the cost is almost nothing but a change of habits. Turn-
7Energy Future Report of the Harvard Business School, Robert
Stobaugh and Daniel Yergin, eds, Ballyntine Publishing Co.,
November ]980, p. 215.
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ing down the thermostat, closing shades, closing off un-
used portions of a house, are just a few of the ways to
keep down the heating bill. Many households find taking
these measures leaves the proportion of their income spent
on fuel relatively constant or that the increase is with-
in acceptable limits. Why undertake a relatively large
investment in insulation when it is not necessary? The
return is high (payback short) but it is also high for
other types of investment that might even be perceived as
less risky. At current energy prices, weatherization may
not be a compelling or even the most attractive invest-
ment for many households.
In all of these cases, consumers are not acting out
of ignorance nor are they constrained by lack of funds.
They are responding to market prices which should reflect
the costs and benefits of weatherization.
One argument for government intervention to stimulate
weatherization is that market price is not the true cost
of energy. Consumers are basing their decisions on today's
prices which are mdch lower than the long run marginal
cost or replacement cost of energy. The government com-
putes the costs and benefits of a weatherization program
according to this price and finds the net effect to be
positive. Also, a program to weatherize is less risky
than an individual's investment. On average, projected
-16-
savings will probably be close to the benefits actually
realized even though the return to some households may be
less.
National security is another frequently cited reason
for conservation policies that directly affect consumer
choice. Reducing the dependence on imported oil will
make the country less susceptible to supply interruptions
and price changes. Reducing demand extends the time that
the existing domestic supply will last in the event of an
interruption. Thus when energy prices rise relative to
other prices, there is less disposable income available
for other expenditures. This causes a contraction in non-
energy sectors and an expansion of the energy sector.
But, much of the demand in the energy sector is met by
sources outside the economy causing a net drain or a nega-
tive balance of payments.
Although national security is not an issue for the
attention of the local governments on Martha's Vineyard,
an interruption of supply would obviously disrupt the lo-
cal economy. A certain amount of oil is stored on the
Island. As is the case for the country as a whole, reduc-
ing demand will lengthen the time that this supply will
last.
Most energy on the Vineyard is supplied by off-Island
sources. .Electricity is generated off-Island by New Bed-
-17-
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ford Gas & Light Company. Suppliers estimate that twenty
cents of every dollar spent on oil stays on the Island.
A survey9 by the Martha's Vineyard Commission found that
in general 35 cents of every dollar spent on the Island
stays in the economy in the initial round of spending.
As expenditures for energy use increase, the Vineyard eco-
nomy will contract. More is spent in the energy sector
relative to other sectors and a higher proportion of what
is spent goes off-Island.
Under these rationales, there are many policies which
directly affect consumer choice. Rather than providing
information or providing the winterization service itself
(or grants), the programs prod consumers to weatherize
with regulations or incentives. Because there are many
variations, the entire next chapter is devoted to the dis-
cussion and critique of existing policies.
8Conversations with Vineyard oil dealers provided this
information.
9 Dukes County Planning and Economic Development Commis-
sion, An Economic Base Study of Dukes County, Massachu-
setts, Fall, 1973, pg. 30. Conversations with planners
for the Vineyard Commission suggest that the multiplier
is the same or slightly lower than it was in 1973.
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CHAPTER 3
Regulations and Incentives: Examples
The discussion of regulation and incentive policies
includes where possible background on the conditions
which led to the adoption of the program and an evalua-
tion of its success.
3.1 Regulations
Santa.Clara, California10
The Board of Supervisors of the County approved an
Energy Audit and Conservation Measures ordinance on Janu-
ary 21, 1980. The reasons for the ordinance included
findings by the Santa Clara County Energy Task Force that
(1) residents are "facing uncertainties in conventional
energy resource supplies and the certainty of rapid cost
increases as a result of the high expense of new energy
production and generation facilities;" (2) retrofit was a
"potential growth industry" in the county; (3) certain
energy conservatiod measures were "cost-effective over the
lifetime of the device in the average home for both donor
and contractor installation."
1 0 Title C of the County of Santa Clara Ordinance Code,
Division C14, Energy Conservation, Chapter I, Residential
Energy Audit and Energy Conservation Measures, Santa Clara,
California.
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The Santa Clara community faces steeply rising energy
costs because new facilities are necessary to meet rising
demand. The area is growing rapidly and conservation is
one way to keep demand within existing capacity. Faced
with costs estimated to be "10 percent of median family
income by 1985" such an ordinance is not likely to be com-
pletely unacceptable. Also, the burden of the ordinance
falls most heavily on those who have had no part in its
adoption-new residents. The ordinance requires retrofit
"prior to resale with minimum energy conservation measures
to the extent that such measures are cost effective for
a homeowner and applicable to the housing." Although the
property owner must comply, the cost of the retrofit can
be shifted to the buyer dependin'g on the elasticity of
demand. Judging from current housing prices in California
it is a seller's market.
The other major reason why the ordinance was passed
is that it requires very little weatherization. On a
$100,000 house, the cost might be $500 to $600, contractor
installed. The incremental addition to mortgage costs is
estimated to be less than the energy savings . The ceil-
ing must be insulated to R-19 unless it is already in "ex-
1 1 Telephone conversation with John P. Cook, Energy Staff,
County of Santa Clara, California.
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cess of R-7 throughout at least 90% of the existing ceil-
ing area." All doors opening to unheated areas must be
weatherstripped, water heaters fitted when insulation
blankets to a minimum of R-6, shower fixtures fitted with
flow restrictQrs, and all heating and hot water pipes in-
sulated if they are in unheated spaces. Any broken window
or hole in the building envelope where "light may be seen"
passing from an unheated and/or uncooled area to a condi-
tioned area must be repaired. There are exceptions to the
requirements if the repair is impossible or unaccessible
or "unusual hardship" is caused. Appeals may be made to
the Code Enforcements Appeals Board.
The ordinance may be extended to include other mea-
sures demonstrated to be cost-effective, as determined by
the Planning Commission. Cost effective is defined as
costs less than benefits over the "expected lifetime of
the energy conservation device." Since cost effectiveness
depends on the lifetime of the device, the rate of return
on the investment may be relatively small, and still be
required. In practice, it may be unlikely that any addi-
tional requirements can gain acceptance unless they clear-
ly exhibit a high rate of return regardless of the defini-
tion of cost effectiveness.
The ordinance can reduce energy consumption only as
fast as houses are sold. Sales are dependent on mortgage
-21-
availability and interest rates, and demand. Sin'ce the
ordinance only went into effect October 1, there is no
experience to evaluate.
An extra step is added to the sales process by the
ordinance because an energy audit is used to determine if
the house meets the standards. However, there is no fol-
low-up to check compliance. Civil action may be brought
by the buyer or action taken by the county if it is noti-
fied of failure to comply. A subsequent buyer may in
turn bring an action against the first buyer if the ori-
ginal buyer did not force compliance by the original sel-
ler. However, failure to comply may not prevent recorda-
tion of the deed or contract of sale. The system is ad-
ministratively easy but does not necessarily result in a
reduction of residential energy consumption.
Livermore, California1 2
This city council passed an ordinance in December
1979 similar to Santa Clara's. However, only ceiling in-
sulation to R-19 (when the area is accessible and the
existing rating is less than R-7) is required at resale.
The same is required upon installation of central air con-
ditioning or when a building is being modified. Modifica-
tion means any enlargement or alteration of habitable
12Livermore, California, City Code, Ordinance No. 1003.
-22-
areas that exceeds "10 percent of the value of the struc-
ture, as determined by the Building Official." The value
of the structure means replacement costs based upon the
square footage costs in the "Building Valuation Data" pub-
lished by the International Conference of Building Offi-
cials.
The Livermore law levies a penalty or places a burden
on residents who increase their consumption as well as on
new residents. It still raises the cost of moving to
Livermore but may be slightly more equitable since resi-
dents also must take some responsibility for increased
consumption. The rate of reduction in energy consumption
is again determined by sales in the area. There is no
provision for expanding the-law nor any discussion of cost
effectiveness in the ordinance. All of the council mem-
bers and the mayor concurred in adopting the ordinance,
one meeting after it was introduced. That is not surpris-
ing since there is pressure to take action to ameliorate
the prospects of steeply rising energy costs caused by
need for more capaaity and this is an action costing cur-
rent residents very little.
Again the pressure for compliance at point of sale is
minimal. There is likely to be more pressure on the buyer
to quickly complete the sale then for fear of paying a
-23-
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noncompliance penalty upon resale.
Davis, California14
The Davis building code has been amended to require
an inspection of any home prior to resale. In addition to
meeting safety standards, the house must have attic insu-
lation to R-19, water heater insulation to R-6, flow re-
strictors on showers (3 gals/minute), and weatherstripped
doors. The seller must comply with the ordinance. Unlike
the Santa Clara County and Livermore laws, there is an
inspection to determine compliance. Failure to comply may
not delay the sale but is an infraction carrying a fine
of up to $250. If there is no retrofit then the buyer can
take action to rescind the sale and may recover all fees.
Because Davis has an inspection and may levy a fine
on violators, compliance is likely to occur. In fact,
15
ninety percent of sellers do comply and the city's attor-
ney had never received a complaint.
1 3 The unstated penalty makes the offense a misdemeanor for
which there is a fine of $500 or six months in jail-com-
ment of Davis, California City Attorney.
14Davis, California building code ordinance as described
by the building inspector.
1 5 Telephone conversation with the building inspector, Davis,
California.
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Los Angeles, California
In 1973 during the oil embargo, Los Angeles cut resi-
dential energy use 18 percent. Electric utility customers
were required to cut their use of electricity compared
with the same billing period of the previous year. The
penalty for noncompliance was a 50 percent surcharge on
the entire bill.
Although this was not a weatherization program, it is
an example of regulation to achieve reduction in energy
consumption. It is probably the most economically effi-
cient way to meet the goal since consumers were left to
make their own decisions about essential and non-essential
uses and even whether to accept the fine. Market prices
for weatherization were not distorted and the results were
immediate.
The demand for electricity is a derived demand.
Electricity is not what is wanted but rather the use of
electricity to power a television, food processor, heater,
or hair dryer. For most goods, the amount consumed rises
as income increases. The same is probably true of elec-
tricity. Therefore, higher income people have higher
bills. They also are more likely to own electric applian-
ces whose use is discretionary or non-essential. The cut-
-25-
1 6 Energy Future, p. 9.
back may have been less of a burden to them than to low
income customers whose use consists of heating and light-
ing only. This means that the regulation may have been
regressive. A remedy to the problem, if it exists, would
be to require a percentage reduction rather than an abso-
lute. The 50 percent surchange would already be progres-
sive if larger bills are an indication of higher income.
Although the program was efficient, quick, and fairly
equitable, it probably would not have happened if the sit-
uation had not been generally perceived as a crisis. The
broad based consensus necessary for its adoption would
not have existed.
3.2 Incentives
Incentives may be loans at subsidized interest rates,
grants, rebates or tax credits. Programs to encourage
weatherization using some or all of these methods to af-
fect consumer choices exist in many states and localities.
Their success in stimulating weatherization, economic ef-
ficiency and equity effects vary considerably depending on
the specific structure of the program.
-26-
3.2.1 Subsidized Loans
New York State17
The Home Insulation and Energy Conservation Act
(HIECA), signed into law in August, 1977, required the
nine major elQctric and gas utilities in New York State
to offer energy audits to their residential customers and
to arrange for financing of the installation of eligible
energy conservation measures. Each utility designed its
HIECA program for its specific franchise territory, sub-
ject to Public Service Commission approval, but the basic
HIECA program characteristics are the same statewide.
Three different types of energy audit are available
to customers. All three consider ceiling or attic insula-
tion, wall insulation, floor and foundation insulation,
hot water insulation, caulking and weatherstripping, storm
doors, storm windows, clock thermostats, furnace and boiler
retrofits, furnace and boiler replacements, regardless of
the fuel used, and heat pumps.
The type A audit is performed by a utility represen-
tative in a customer's house. The information is analyzed
to determine the payback for the energy conservation mea-
sured.approved by the Commission. A $10 fee, waivable if
1 7 Second Annual Report on Implementation of the New York
State Home Insulation and Energy Conservation Act, New
York State Public Service Commission, Albany, New York.
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the customer's income is below the federal poverty guide-
line, is charged.
Type B audit requires the customer to collect the
data which are analyzed by the utility to determine pay-
back and cost. The fee is not more than $3.00.
Customers perform type C audits by themselves from a
workbook distributed by the utility. The book gives in-
structions for calculating energy savings as well as in-
stallation instructions.
The utility provides the customers with a list of
contractors in the area who can install the various mea-
sures. These contractors have signed an agreement with
the utility to be listed as approved contractors. The re-
quirements for approval include at least one year of ex-
perience in working with the measures to be installed,
good standing with the Better Business Bureau or its equi-
valent, satisfactory credit rating, adequate comprehensive
insurance, and any required license. In addition, a one-
year guarantee on workmanship and materials must be of-
fered.
Each utility has made arrangements with at least two
banks in its territory to make loans to customers for
energy conservation improvements. The interest rate on
these loans may be no more than the utility's overall rate
of return--generally between nine and ten percent. Loans
-28-
may be written for up to seven years, subject to a minimum
monthly payment of $10.00. They are available only for
energy conservation improvements having a payback period
of seven years or less but they are available to anyone
regardless of credit worthiness. The energy conservation
measures to be financed may be installed on a do-it-your-
self basis or by a contractor. The minimum amount that
may be loaned is $200; the maximum is $2,500 for a one-
family house, $3,500 for a two-family house, $4,000 for a
three-family house and $4,500 for a four-family house.
The utilities' arrangements with the banks vary.
Some banks are willing to grant loans directly to custo-
mers at an interest rate equal to the utility's rate of
return, while others require the utility to guarantee all
the loans as a condition of granting them at that rate.
And some banks require the utility to make up the differ-
ence between its rate of return and the interest rate at
which the bank generally lends. During the fall of 1979,
three banks in the downstate area withdrew from the pro-
gram in response t6 changes in prevailing interest rates.
In cases such as these, the utility must make arrangements
with other banks to ensure that at least two banks in its
service territory are available to provide loans under the
program.
HIECA (which was the model for the federal residential
-29-
conservation service program l) combines subsidized loans
with an energy audit service to market the conservation
measures. Individual reports from the nine participating
utilities were used to compile Tables 3-1, 3-2 and the up-
dated Table 3-3. As of May 31, 1980, approximately 267,000
audits have been completed (A and B) or requested (C) from
about 3.8 million eligible dwellings. Twenty-five hundred
loans have been requested and twenty-three hundred have
been granted. The program has cost the utilities an esti-
mated $2-3 million which is recouped from the rate payers.
Only 4.3 percent of the people who had an A or B
audit during the period June 1978 to September 1979 (Table
3.2) went on to get a loan, while 30.8 percent of those
who had an A or B audit installed conservation devices
without obtaining financing under the program. A mail
survey of 3,000 utility customers who requested audit C
workbooks showed 18 percent of the 1229 who returned the
questionnaires used at least one of the measures. There
is no information on the relationship between loans re-
quested and type C~audits requested.
The results of the program do not show a tremendous
response from consumers. The Public Service Commission
has attributed this in part to a less than enthusiastic
1 8 The Federal Residential Conservation Service Program
will be a similar program to HIECA in all states., (Title
II of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978)
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promotion by the utilities. Utilities may find themselves
19
financing oil-burner replacements or discussing conver-
sions to another type of heating fuel during audits.
Given these factors and the program goal of reducing de-
mand for their product when over capacity exists, it would
not be surprising to find some reluctance to promote the
program among utilities.
Reducing the interest rate on a weatherization loan
does not appear to make weatherization substantially more
attractive. The data also indicate that an energy audit
conducted entirely or in part by a utility representative
is more likely to result in an investment in conservation
than an audit completed by the consumer. The New York
State Residential Insulation survey taken in 197720 showed
that only one percent of the homeowners had refrained from
adding insulation because they had been unable to obtain
financing. It may be that the marketing effort, aimed at
overcoming consumer skepticism or lack of information, is
more responsible for the weatherization under HIECA than
the loan program.
1 9 Brooklyn Union, Long Island Lighting Company and Roches-
ter Gas and Electric, arguing that financing oil burner
replacements unfairly subsidized a competitive industry,
challenged the Public Service Commission's inclusion of
oil burners in a court proceeding. On December 6, 1979,
the Appellate Division, Third Department, determined that
oil burner replacements were properly included in the pro-
gram, pg. 7-8, 2nd Annual HIECA Report.
2 0 pg. 17, 1st Annual HIECA Report.
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TABLE 3-1
Summary of Results of Home Insulation and
Energy Conservation Act Programs
June 15, 1978 to September 30, 1979
I. Effect of the Program on Conservation of Fuel and
Energy
Installations financed throuigh Utilities' Program
Annual savings of gas
Annual savings of oil
Annual savings of electricity
43,325 Mcf/yr.
157,593 gal/yr.
80,507 kWh/yr.
Installations not financed through Utilities'
Program
Annual savings of gas 91,672 Mcf/yr.
Annual savings of oil 603,411 gal/yr.
Annual savings of electricity 236,505 kWh/yr.
Total Annual Savings
Annual savings of gas 134,997 Mcf/yr.
Annual savings of oil 761,004 gal/yr.
Annual savings of electricity 317,012 kWh/yr.
II. Cost Savings to Participating Customers
Installations financed through Utilities'.Programs
Gas heat customers
Oil heat customers
Electric heat customers
$ 128,449 /yr.
$ 88,480 /yr.
$ 2,822 /yr.
Installations not financed through Utilities'
Programs
Gas heat customers
Oil heat customers
Electric heat customers
$ 272,152 /yr.
$ 339,116 /yr.
$ 8,390 /yr.
-Total cost savings to participating customers
$ 839,409 /yr.
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TABLE 3-1 (Cont.)
III. Capital Cost to Participating Customers for Instal-
lations
Installations financed through Utilities' Programs
Gas heat customers
Oil heat customers
Electric heat customers
Installations not financed
grams
Gas heat customers
Oil heat customers
Electric heat customers
Total capital cost for
installations
$ 668,448
$ 337,723
$ 6,746
through Utilities' Pro-
$ 1,680,144
$ 1,833,917
$ 28,874
$ 4,555,852
Information on utility loan installation is directly
available from utility records. Information on non-utility
financed installation is gathered by surveys conducted by
the utilities.
Source: Second Annual Report on Implementation of the New
York State Home Insulation and Energy Conservation Act,
NYS Public Service Commission, June 31, 1980.
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TABLE 3-2
Program Indicators
A& B audits resulting in installation of
measures financed under HIECA Act
A& B audits resulting in installation of
measures not financed under HIECA Act'
C audits resulting in installation of
measures2
Average cost to utility of A audit
Average cost of financed installation3
Average cost of unfinanced installation
Average payback period of financed
installations
Average payback period of unfinanced
installations
4.3 %
30.8 %
18.0 %
$ 94
$ 1604
$ 708
5.1 yrs.
5.7 yrs.
Total cost of program
Cost to utilities
Cost to financing customersk
Cost to other customers
Total
$ 2,911,804
1,012,917
3,542,935
$ 7,467,656
'Estimate based on utility surveys
2Preliminary result
3Excluding finance charges
4Excluding finance charges
Source: Second Annual Report on Implementation of the New
York State Home Insulation and Energy Conservation Act,
NYS Public Service Commission, January 31, 1980.
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TABLE 3-3
Cumulative Report of HIECA Program
as of May 31, 1980
of Audit
A
B
C
Requested
Requested
56,339
12, 713
215,535
Granted
Completed
47,184
3,796
NA
Amount
Loans 2,501 2,320 $ 3,640,640
Source: HIECA Implementation Reporo, Cumulative as of May
31, 1980.
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Type
Rochester, New York2l
The experience of the Energy Audit Project in Ward
19, Rochester, New York, tends to confirm the importance
of marketing. The Project was part of a comprehensive
neighborhood improvement effort and was a joint venture of
the 19th Ward Community Association,22 Rochester Gas and
Electric Corporation (PG&E) and the City of Rochester.
The City allocated CETA funds for two full-time Energy
Auditors to be trained by RG&A and supervised by the Assc-
ciation. Staff and neighbor volunteers used block club
meetings, school presentations, door-to-door leafleting,
television and newspaper advertising, a booth at the Asso-
ciation's street fair, and articles in the Association's
newspaper to publicize the Project, and the availability
of free audits.
The audit process itself involved at least two visits
to the home. The first visit, which is by appointment, is
an interview and inspection. The follow-up visit is a
presentation of the audit results and the available loans
and grants. If the resident decides to undertake an im-
2 1 The Energy Audit Project, An Interim Report for the
period January-September 1979, 19th Ward Community Asso-
ciation, Inc., Rochester, New York, October 10, 1979.
2 2 The 19th Ward Community Association is part of the
Community Services Administration community assistance
program.
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provement, the auditor often is called upon again, for ad-
vice.
The importance of the marketing process can be seen
in the statistics which show the Project area with one
percent of RG&E's customers requesting seventeen percent
of the audits and twenty-five percent of the loans.2 3
Although some homeowners were reluctant to provide infor-
mation on the type of financing used, six sources of fi-
nancing were identified. Fifty-one percent relied on per-
sonal sources, twenty-five percent used RG&E loans, six-
teen percent used grants from the housing improvement
program, four percent used housing improvement program
loans and another four percent borrowed from the federally
funded 312 program. The high percentage of people using
personal funds may also be a reflection of the type of im-
provement made. Weatherstripping, which is among the
most inexpensive conservation measures, was the most fre-
quently selected as Table 3-4 shows.
3.2.2 Partial Rebate
A rebate is a'form of a grant. However, grants are
received prior to the weatherization work whereas rebates
are reimbursements to homeowners. The Boston rebate pro-
2 3 Community Solar Options; Changing Your Energy Future,
September 29-30, 1980, Chicopee, Massachusetts, comments
by Caroline Argust, 1 9 th Ward Community Association.
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TABLE 3-4
Types of Improvements %
Attic insulation 17
Wall insulation 7
Storm windows 19
Storm doors 16
Weatherstripping 31
Caulking 10
Sources of Financing %
Personal 51
Housing Improvement Program Grant 16
Housing Improvement Program Loan 4
312 Program Loan 4
RG&E Loan 25
Source: An Interim Report of the Energy Audit Project for
the period January-September 1979, 19th Ward Community
Association, Inc., Preservation Program, Rochester, New
York, October 10, 1979.
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gram allows the homeowner to choose his contractor or in-
stall the measures himself. The Wareham winterization
program includes installation. The latter program is more
restrictive because it is without cost to the recipient.
The reimbursement nature of a rebate insures that the work
is actually done because the homecwner bears the initial
cost.
Boston, Massachusetts24
The City of Boston's Housing Improvement Program
(HIP) was extended to provide rebates for weatherization
as well as repair. Because the funding is part of a Com-
munity Development Block Grant, the program must princi-
pally benefit low and moderate income persons. Low income
homeowners and renters are eligible for free energy audits
and rebates of 40 percent. Moderate income homeowners may
receive 20 percent rebates and free energy audits. In
addition, the City has a requirement that a certain level
of weatherization be the result of the investment. Attics
must be insulated to R-19, all windows must have storm
windows, doors must have storm doors or be weatherstripped,
and smoke detectors must be installed. The maximum rebate
is $2,000.
2 4 Information from Michael Mahoney, Boston City Hall, tele-
phone conversation, August, 1980.
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The program began August 1, 1980. There had, been
only 311 requests for audits or audits and rebates by
October 1. This has been attributed25 to lack of market-
ing, the minimum weatherization requirements, and the pro-
gram being introduced in the summer.
It is difficult to judge how effective the program
will be in promoting weatherization from the short period
it has been in existence. As with 100% grants, the pro-
gram is restricted to those for whom financing may be
difficult. However, the partial rebate program assumes
that the homeowner can pay for part' of the weatherization.
Also the homeowner must invest his funds first and then be
reimbursed. He can afford some amount of weatherization
himself whereas 100% grant tecipients presumably cannot.
Provided that the rebate is attractive enough, i.e., the
energy savings pay back the homeowner's share of the in-
vestment in a very short time, rebates will induce weather-
ization from the eligible group. The art of designing the
cost efficient program is to determine exactly what the
payback must be tokjust induce the desired weatherization.
The inclusion of the minimum requirements assures the city
that the measures likely to have the greatest payback are
undertaken first although the cost may deter some poten-
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2Ibid.
tial beneficiaries. Those too poor to make the initial
investment or too wealthy to be eligible will not be
affected by the program.
3.2.3 Tax Credits
Many states and the federal government provide income
tax credits for installation of conservation measures and
renewable energy systems. Few states have systems for
monitoring the impact of the credits but the federal gov-
ernment has recorded the credit taken under the Energy Tax
Act of 1978.
Massachusetts does not give tax credits for conserva-
tion measures although it does exempt solar systems from
property tax for twenty years from the date of installa-
tion. There is a personal income tax credit of 35 percent
of the cost of renewable energy equipment. The equipment
must be installed at the taxpayer's pricipal residence in
the state. Maximum credit is $1,000. Eligible equipment
must use solar energy for space heating or cooling or
water heating or must use wind energy for any non-business
resientil pupos" 26residential purpose.2 (In California, approximately 60
percent of the tax credits are for solar heating of swim-
2 6Chapter 796, Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
1979.
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ming pools.) If a federal income tax credit or, grant
is received by the taxpayer, the state credit will be
reduced.
In addition, sales of equipment for residential
solar, wind or heat pump systems are exempt from sales
tax. 2 8
U.S. Energy Tax Act of 197829
The following description of the Act and taxpayer
response is included as an example of conservation promot-
ing legislation. State laws are similar.
Clearly, higher income taxpayers are more likely to
be induced to invest in weatherization by a tax credit
incentive. To benefit from the program, an individual
must have enough income to pay taxes and to afford the
energy conservation measure.
There are no data on the energy savings from the in-
vestment although the cost in lost tax dollars is given
by the tables. The information is not sufficient to de-
2
.Conversation with' Pat Lawson, National Solar Heating and
Cooling Information Center.
2 8 Chapter 796, Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
1979.
29
. Preliminary Statistics of Individual Income Tax Returns,
Internal Revenue Service, 1978.
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EXHIBIT A
Description of U.S. Energy Tax Act of 1978
The 
,
credit was actually made up of two
separate parts, one based-on qua-
lified "energy coservation ex-
penditures" and t'he other on -
qualified "renewa'le energy source
expenditures," with different
requirements for each type of
credit. The entire residential
energy credit was available for
qualified items installed in or on
the taxpayer's principal residence
from April 20, 1 77, through
December 31, 1985. However, the
credit could not be claimed for
any taxable year ceginning before
January 1, 1978; therefore, it was
first available for use on 1978 .
tax returns. A maximum amount was
specified for ea.,h part of the
credit, although a minimum $10
amount for the su= of both credits
was required bef'ore any credit was
allowed. None of the credit was
refundable, but any credit ex-
ceeding income tax reduced by all
other statutory credits could be
carried over to subsequent years
through 1987.
The credit for energy con-
servation property was 15 percent
of the first $2,000 of expendi-
tures, including original instal-
lation costs, with a maximum
credit of $300 per residence over
the entire period the credit is to
oe in effect. The credit was
available for each dwelling unit
used by the taxpayer as a princi-
pal residence; however, the con-
struction of the dwelling unit had
to be substantially completed
before Aptl .20, 1077, in order
for the energy conservation
expenditures to qualify. In
additicn, the taxpayer had to
be the first person to use the
property installed and that
property had to be expected to
remain in use for at least 3
years. Energy conservation pro-
perty consisted of insulation,
storm.windows and doors, caulking
and weatherstripping, and certain
other items (such as an automatic
energy-saving setback thermostat,
furnace replacement burner, or a
meter displaying the cost of
energy usage). Data for each of
Table 3-5 shows the response to the tax credit for
The size of the credits taken is reported in Table
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1978.
3-6.
TABLE 3-5
Returns with Energy Conservation Expenditures
(All figures are based on samples)
Size of Adjusted
Gross Income
Under $5,000
$5,000 - $9,999
$10,000-$14,999
$15,000-$191999
$20,000 or more
Number of
Returns
with Energy
Conservation
Expenditures
57,127
436,644
641,347
1,119,561
3,646,109
Amount of
Expenditure
[$ in thousands]
44,462
282,704
413,676
696,275
2,652,978
Amount of
Energy
Conservation
Credit Before
Limitation
[$ in thousands]
5,588
38,476
57,977
95,939
358,884
From: Table 8-Returns with Residential Energy Expenditures: Expenditures by
Type and Computation of the Energy Credit by Size of Adjusted Gross Income,
Preliminary Statistics of Individual Income Tax Returns, 1978.
TABLE 3-6
Returns with Energy Conservation Credit by Size
Size of Credit
Total
$ 1- $ 99
$100 - $199
$200 - $299
$300 - $399
$400 - $499
Number of
Returns
with Credit
5,900,783
3,972,410
1,098,802
396,686
432,886
-0-
Amount
Before
Limitation
[$ in thousands]
557,884
178,514
152,349
97,127
129,873
-0-
$500 - $999
$1000 and above -0-
*
4
*
3
-0-
Estimates should be used with caution because of the
small number of returns on which it is based.
From: Returns with Residential Energy Credit or Business
Energy Credit: Type of Credit by Size, Preliminary Sta-
tistics of Individual Tax Returns, 1978
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termine where the credit reduced the marginal cost to the
homeowner enough to induce the investment rather than
simply making a previous decision to invest more attrac-
tive. A survey of energy bills before and after weather-
ization would be necessary to evaluate the benefits of the
program.
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CHAPTER 4
Determining a Policy for Martha's Vineyard
4.1 A Review of the Alternatives
The town governments on Martha's Vineyard may provide
financing, incentives, information or regulations to stim-
ulate weatherization on the Island. A program to fund low
income homeowners who cannot afford the investments exists.
So does a method of providing information and at least
one incentive to weatherize (federal tax credit). What
then is the best use of resources to reduce residential
energy consumption efficiently and equitably, given the
economic, political, and social constraints on the Island?
Adding to the low income winterization program is
probably not the best use of funds since it already pro-
vides a fairly complete service. Also, the amount of
money available in local coffers is probably not enough
to significantly extend the benefits.30
Incentive programs will achieve results but, as sec-
tion 2.2 showed, it is the specific structure of the pro-
gram that determines who is likely to benefit and how
widespread the benefits will be. The incentive structure
3 Benefits could be extended to more residents by raising
the income level which determines eligibility for the pro-
gram, if there was sufficient funding.
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also determines how much more desirable an investment in
weatherization is than it would be at market prices. An
efficient program would make the investment just attrac-
tive enough to induce the maximum weatherization without
payments to those who would have weatherized anyway. An
equitable program might not be the most efficient. It
would be aimed at making weatherization affordable to
those who lack financing and might weatherize less homes
for a given amount of money. However, these investments
might yield a higher return because the homes are initially
in worse condition.
Again, local governments probably do not have the
funds to establish an incentive program on their own. Most
localities must rely on state and federal monies for other
than the basic services. These funds usually carry re-
strictions, which means the locality would not be free to
.determine the structure of the program..
Although regulation allows the local government to
try to affect residential energy consumption without the
aid of other levels of government, results depend very
much on the attitudes of the residents. The preferences
of a local community are reflected in local laws. The
emphasis placed on equity versus economic and administra-
tive efficiency will be expressed in the structure of the
regulation because community approval is necessary for
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passage and cooperation necessary for enforcement.
The mandated curtailment of energy usage in Los An-
geles carried a stiff penalty for violation. It was im-
plemented through the utility billing system where detec-
tion of a violation was simple. If there was a method to
ensure detection and hence enforcement of a retrofit or-
dinance, then a similar regulation would probably be suc-
cessful on the Vineyard. However, community approval for
a strictly mandated curtailment involving the utility in
the detection and penalty process might easily be impos-
sible to achieve.
The other California regulatory schemes rely on the
buyer or an institutional structure to ensure compliance.
The buyer has little incentive to force compliance in
Livermore or Santa Clara County. The sellers' market pre-
vailing in California and in Massachusetts may mean that
the buyer will lose the property if he attempts to delay
the sale. A mandatory inspection scheme, similar to
Davis' s, with fines for noncompliance could be established
on Martha's Vineyard. However, it requires a major change
in an institutional structure that may not be in keeping
with Yankee philosophy. Inspection is now available to
buyers on request. Making it mandatory may be considered
government interference.
A Massachusetts regulation similar to the point of
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sale energy code enforcement is the lead paint law. The
regulation requires there be no lead paint up to a certain
height on the wall (within a child's reach). It is up to
the buyer to attain compliance prior to the sale. But the
law is never enforced because the only motivation the
buyer may have is to protect himself on resales. Assuming
a seller's market still exists at that time, the motiva-
tion to file a complaint is minimal.
Because of the difficulty in designing an enforceable
regulation which will meet with community approval and
cooperation, regulation is probably not the best method of
reducing residential energy consumption through weatheri-
zation.
The local government may be best equipped to dispense
information and dispel skepticism about the value of wea-
therization rather than try to directly influence market
prices. Through the educational process, the locality may
even be able to tap private sources of funds.
Given the lack of funds and the problems with regula-
tion, it is not surprising that the local government may
take the role of promoting weatherization by acting as a
coordinator and center for information. Support by the
local government can help legitimize the idea of weatheri-
zation and lessen the mistrust of energy auditors. Plans
featuring a strong outreach effort, community involvement
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and identifiable information centers can ensure that local
resources are used in the most efficient way-to leverage
the communities' use of federal and state funds by insur-
ing that citizens take advantage of all incentives.
The strategies' used in Rochester, New York and the
Fitchburg, Massachusetts Action to Conserve Energy (two
of the most successful plans) featured extensive community
outreach and volunteer efforts. Weatherization workshops,
neighborhood energy centers, free or reduced-cost kits of
materials and volunteer crew assistance involved over 3500
Fitchburg households in low cost/no cost weatherization.31
Northampton, Massachusetts is another community which
cleverly used various funding sources, including the pri-
vate sector, to create a successful program. Discount
coupons worth 25% of materials cost were made available
to anyone who attended weatherization training sessions.
Six local businesses agreed to cooperate with the plan and
65-70% of the coupons were redeemed.32 The City also or-
ganized a competition among contractors to lower the cost
31Massachusetts Local Energy Action Program (LEAP), Case
Histories, Booklet 3, prepared as one of a series by Arrow-
street, Inc. under a grant from the Northeast Solar Energy
Center as part of the Solar Cities and Towns Program of
the U.S. Department of Energy, August 1980.
3 2 Telephone conversation with program coordinator, North-
ampton, Massachusetts.
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of insulation. Nearly 70% of the homes in Northampton
were built before 1945 and have uninsulated walls and
attics. Contractors bid on supplying insulator (on a
price per square foot basis) for all interested homeowners
in a particular area knowing that the homes are similar.
As a result of supplying a large number of houses at once,
33
the residents will save as much as 20%.
A program which does not provide funding but taps
private sources and takes full advantage of federal funds
can be very successful in promoting weatherization. A
plan which markets existing incentives and does not ne-
glect the private sector, so that the system is tailored
to the community, is in general likely to have a signifi-
cant impact.
4.2 Impact of an Information/Marketing Program
Although it appears that an information and marketing
strategy is the most likely role for Vineyard governments,
given their economic and political contraints, and although
it appears from the experience of other communities that
such a plan can have significant impact, the question of
the likely impact on Islanders' decisions still remains.
The Appendix to this thesis contains a description
and critique of a model of the impacts of weatherization
3 3 A.
LEAP, op. cit.
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investments on home heating bills. The model was used to
calculate the rates of return a houseowner could expect
from various levels of investment in insulation, storm
windows, storm doors, and weatherstripping.
Results (Table 4-1) were obtained under two different
sets of assumptions. One (Case A) is based on a descrip-
tion of the current weatherization of the New England
housing stock. The other (Case B) reflects the responses
obtained by an ERG survey of Island residents.
From the ERG survey, it appears that homes on the
Vineyard may be better weatherized than homes in New Eng-
land. As a result, the payback periods or rates of return
on the investments are between 2 and 5 years for Vineyard
dwellings but less than 4-or 2 years on average-for New
34
England housing in general. If, as seems likely, the ERG
survey is a more accurate representation of Vineyard homes,
then the significant difference in results from the model
suggests that an information program may be of little
value. Homeowners on the Island are aware of the benefits
of weatherization and have invested up to the point of
diminishing marginal returns. The highest return, lowest
cost improvements which might be neglected by the unknow-
3 4 The ERG data do not exactly fit the specifications of
REFORM. Therefore, Case B also reflects the judgement of
the thesis writer.
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TABLE 4-1
*
Results from REFORM
Case A
Annual
Energy
Savings
when
Year of
Construction
1965-1979
I,
1940-1965
pre 1940
Initial Level of
Insulation and
Fuel Type
Base/Electric
Level 1/Electric
Level 3/Electric
Base/Fossil
Level 1/Fossil
Level 3/Fossil
Base/Fossil
Level 1/Fossil
Level 3/Fossil
Uninsulated Base/
Fossil
Uninsulated Level
3/Fossil
Insulated Base/
Fossil
Number
of
Units
564
679
950
1215
427
Weather-
ized to
Ideal
Level
$ 901
656
692
1442
459
Amount
of
Invest-
ment
$ 2390
1782
1185
2590
2266
1668
2558
2267
1783
3050
1960
1191
Number
of
Units
21
148
42
206
723
103
177
618
88
165
1149
328
Case B
Annual
Energy
Savings
when
Weather-
ized to
Ideal
Level
$ 901
792
485
656
599
406
692
463
334
1442
878
459
*
For description of model see Appendix I and II.
ledgable consumer have been made.
The success of the Fitchburg and Northampton plans
reflects the fact that, on average, homes in New England
can benefit from weatherization as is shown by Case A.
A similar attempt to leverage Island resources by market-
ing weatherization will be less successful because the
rates of return that Island homeowners can expect from
their investments on average are lower.
These results suggest that consumer choice must be
directly affected to promote weatherization on the Vine-
yard. Since regulation is unlikely to be passed, an in-
centive program which alters the cost-benefit structure
is probably the best method for stimulating the invest-
ments.
4.3 A Rebate Policy
Suppose the community was able to fund one incentive
program designed to its specification without restrictions.
The town may take the strategy of offering an incentive
which is unlike those currently offered, administratively
simple, and likely to produce the greatest results. Cur-
rent financing arrangements include bank loans, sometimes
at reduced interest rates, and tax credits.
The community could offer loans at a reduced interest
rate or give a loan subsidy. Administering any type of
loan program could be a multiyear commitment and would
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involve the locality in a business for which it has no ex-
pertise (banking). The cost of providing an incentive to
weatherize using loan financing may be greater than with
schemes that do not create a long term liability for con-
sumers. That is, consumers may have an aversion to bor-
rowing which must be overcome as well as making weatheri-
zation appear more attractive. Also, a program already
exists that offers similar incentives.
Grants of 100% would be attractive incentives to
most consumers. However, it is not the most efficient use
of funds. Weatherization will be induced by lowering its
cost. The cost need not be zero to cause reinvestments.
Even grants to partially fund weatherization have a polic-
ing problem. The government must spend resources making
sure grants are used for weatherization. There is no in-
herent feature of grants to ensure the appropriate use of
funds.
Manipulating the property tax is another way to pro-
vide a further incentive for weatherization. The other
funding source could then be used to make up any shortfall
in revenues necessary to support local services. The in-
centive would be a one time reduction in property taxes
based on a reduction in demand. Heating bills for the
same period in two consecutive years would be compared. A
minimum reduction would be necessary to be eligible for
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some credit to promote weatherization other than low cost/
no cost measures. The greater the percentage reduction in
energy demanded the greater the credit up to a maximum of
maybe 70% of the tax bill.
Using a percentage reduction in taxes means larger
and more highly assessed properties will receive the
greatest credit. Larger houses probably do consume more
energy so this would be an efficient strategy. However,
wealthier homeowners with more highly assessed properties
would also be receiving the most credit. A cut in heating
bills could be the result of changing to a renewable re-
source so the program may not always induce weatherization.
Even though energy audits are available to help con-
sumers determine their likely energy savings and hence tax
deduction, the calculation is only approximate. The cre-
dit makes the investment "possibly" more attractive. The
uncertainty may mean that a larger incentive is necessary,
thereby reducing the energy savings that can be induced.
Another drawback to the program is that the locality does
not know how many homeowners will take the incentive and
what the eventual effect will be on tax revenues. There
is the possibility that the hypothetical additional funds
will be insufficient to cover expenditures for basic ser-
vices.
A more direct approach to inducing weatherization is
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to provide partial rebates. No similar program exists yet
the group who might take the incentive is those who could
borrow or take tax credits and still don't weatherize.
Embedded in the structure is a policing mechanism since
homeowners must present bills to be reimbursed. There is
no threat to basic services because tax revenue is unaf-
fected. A flat percentage rewards greater investment
which might benefit wealthier people more. Putting a max-
imum on the rebate will lessen this effect. The percentage
rebated could also vary with income.
Determining the exact percentage to be rebated depends
on the funds available and the current condition of the
housing stock. It also depends on what is considered to be
enough to induce weatherization but not be considered a
"gift" to those who could afford weatherization.
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CHAPTER 5
Benefits of a Rebate Program
5.1 Assumptions
A rebate program to insulate all 3825 units from the
initial conditions of Case B to the ideal level averages
$2056 per unit or about $7.9 million in total. With a
$300 per unit federal tax credit, the local share of in-
vestment would be about $6.7 million divided among indivi-
duals and the government. Again, it is unlikely that such
a large investment will be made so assume that the program
will be one third as large, or $2.6 million.
Energy savings average $690. For the individual with
a $300 tax credit, the net investment will be $1210. A
30% rebate will lower the net outflow the first year by
$660 or essentially halve it. The investment will be
easily recoverable in the second year rather than the
third as it would without the rebate. This is the incen-
tive to weatherize.
For a $2.10 million investment, 1275 houses can be
weatherized. Individuals will spend $1.57 million, the
local government will spend $.67 million, and the federal
government will spend about $.38 million. A survey con-
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35
ducted by the Martha's Vineyard Commission in 1973 con-
cluded that in general 65 percent of a dollar spent on the
Island is part of the export economy. Thirty-five cents
remains in the Martha's Vineyard economy, making the gen-
eral multiplier 1.5. Interviews with suppliers show that
only 20 cents of each dollar spent for oil remains on the
Island.36 Almost all of a dollar spent on electricity
goes off-Island. 37 Interviews with Island contractors and
installers showed that materials varied between twenty and
thirty percent of a weatherization job. All materials are
assumed to be purchased off-Island. With this information
and the assumptions of constant prices and all investments
being made in one year, the effect of the program on the
Island economy can be calculated.
Although the insulation and winterization sector of
the economy will expand, the energy suppliers will face a
cutback in income. If energy savings are $660 per unit on
average, then total investment savings will be $.84 mil-
lion. According to the model (See Appendix for details),
savings on oil will be about 94% of the $.84 million. At
3 5 Dukes County Planning and Economic Development Commis-
sion, pp. cit.
3 6 Island suppliers of oil, propane, and electricity all
provided information to the author.
3 7 Ibid.
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20 cents per dollar spent, the Vineyard oil supply sector
will contract by $.19 million initially due to decreased
expenditures on oil. The multiplier will cause total con-
traction to be $.29 million. A similar effect due to de-
creased consumption of electricity will cause a $.03 mil-
lion contraction (under the assumption that one percent of
every dollar spent on electricity stays on the Island).
Neither oil nor electricity supply businesses are labor
intensive. Their services will still be necessary, al-
though perhaps less frequently used. The effect on these
jobs will probably be negligible.
Table 5-1 shows multiplier effects in terms of overall
Island income and the initial expansion in jobs for the
one year program. There are two different scenarios in
the table corresponding to weatherization materials costs
of 20 and 40 percent.
5.2 Economic Effect of a Rebate Program
The federal government's share of the investment will
cause an expansion of the Island economy because it is an
infusion of new funds.38 The energy savings corresponding
to $.84 million of the individuals' investment are a shift
from the energy sector to the weatherization sector. This
3 8 Some of the federal contribution will be from taxes paid
by Islanders.
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TABLE 5-1
Total Investment: $ 2.62 million
Expansion due to federal and individual share
$380,000 + $1,570,000 = $1,950,000
20 percent labor -+ .20 x $1,950,000 = $390,000
At $20/hr -+ 19,500 hours
At $1856 hrs/man/yr -+ 10.5 jobs
The multiplier effect = 1.5 x $390,000 =
eventual expansion in the economy
40 percent labor -+ .40 x $1950,000 = $780,000
At $20/hr + 39,000 hours
At $1856 hrs/man/yr -+ 21 jobs
The multiplier effect = 1.5 x $780,000 =
eventual expansion in the economy
$585,000
$1,170,000
Expected Energy Savings = 1275 units x $660/unit = $841,500
Savings in oil = .94 x $841,500 = $791,000
Savings in electricity = .06 x $841,500 = $50,490
Contraction in oil sector = .20 x $791,000 x 1.5 = $237,300
Contraction in electricity sector
= .01 x $50,490 x 1.5 = $757
40% labor expan-
sionary effect
Oil sector
contractor
Electricity sec-
tor contractor
Net effect
$1,170,000
- 237,300
- 757
$ 931,940
20% labor expan-
sionary effect
Oil sector
contractor
Electricity sec-
tor contractor
Net effect
$585,000
-237,300
- 757
$346,943
-62-
effect is also likely to contribute to the net expansion
shown in Table 5-1, because less of the expenditures for
weatherization are part of the export economy.
However, the balance of individuals' investment, $.73
million, and the local government's share, $.67 million,
will be shifts from other sectors to the weatherization
sector. As a result, there is not likely to be any signi-
ficant overall effect on Island income from the shift since
the multiplier reduction in discretionary expenditure will
be balanced by the multiplier expansion in the weatheriza-
tion sector. However, individuals may suffer because de-
mand in their sector falls and they cannot shift to the
installation sector. The contribution of the federal gov-
ernment insures a slight expansionary effect in the first
year which will be lessened to the extent that some of the
new jobs are taken by people currently receiving transfer
payments. The transfers will be replaced by income from
jobs. The difference in amount will be the expansion.
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CHAPTER 6
Conclusions and Suggestions
6.1 Conclusions
From the ERG survey and the results of the. model, it
appears the housing stock on Martha's Vineyard may be sig-
nificantly better weatherized than the average house in
New England. The rate of return that an Island homeowner
can expect from additional investment is lower than the
return generally expected by the homeowner in New England.
A plan to inform Vineyarders is less likely to promote
weatherization than similar successful programs because
Islanders are already aware of the benefits.
If the Island has the resources then, a rebate pro-
gram would be most likely to induce further weatheriza-
tion. It significantly lowers the cost to the consumer,
shortening the payback and raising the rate of return.
Although the program will cause an expansion of the Vine-
yard economy, the effect will be slight. The potential
expansionary impact will increase as energy prices rise
more quickly than other prices. It will also increase if
the export percentage of a dollar spent on energy rises.
However, as energy prices rise relative to prices, the
rate of return expected by the individual consumer will
also rise. It may become unnecessary to provide any other
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incentive to affect consumer choice.
6.2 Suggestions
The results in this thesis are based on a description
of the year-round owner occupied dwellings. Many of the
Vineyard homes are not occupied year round and yet are
heated. Another policy area to consider is stimulating
weatherization of these dwellings.
An information program with community outreach and
involvement is not likely to be very successful because
most of the homeowners are usually off-Island. It would
be difficult to completely exclude these dwellings from
the rebate program discussed in Chapter 5. Undoubtedly
some seasonal homeowners would benefit because "seasonal"
is difficult to define. The expansionary effect would be
greater to the extent that the "season" would be extended.
However, the resources needed to fund such a program would
be much greater and even less likely to be available to
local governments. Mandating weatherization for these
dwellings is not possible for the same reasons it is not
possible in general. It would be unlikely to be approved.
Another possible policy is a regulation not necessar-
ily aimed at weatherization per se but rather at insuring
that year round residents were given fuel first in the
event of a shortfall. Dealers and suppliers may decide to
adopt this policy in a crisis because it is in their in-
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terests. They can have the same amount of revenue with
fewer deliveries and lower costs. A regulation would take
the decision of when to implement this policy out of the
hands of the dealers, giving the local community more con-
trol of the energy supply.
Again, the definition of year round versus seasonal
makes any policy very difficult to administer. The local
governments may want to investigate a set of different
definitions to discover the effects of each in relation to
various policies.
-66-
APPENDIX I
A Model of Energy Consumption for
Home Heating on Martha's Vineyard
The New England Regional Commission (NERCOM) has
developed a model to predict the energy savings from a set
of different investments in weatherization. The Residen-
tial Energy Forecasting Model (REFORM)1 simulates five
alternative residential energy conservation scenarios cor-
responding to five levels of investment for weatherization.
The model was originally used to compute energy savings
for New England on the basis of meteorological data and a
description of the structural/thermal characteristics of
the New England housing stock. This thesis uses the same
model with data from Martha's Vineyard to predict energy
savings for Island homes.
REFORM breaks down the housing stock into five cate-
gories-single family detached, single family attached,
multi-family high rise, multi-family low rise, and mobile
homes. Almost all the dwelling units on Martha's Vineyard
fall into one category, single family detached. As a
result, this thesis concentrates on policies which will
New England Regional Commission, Residential Energy Con-
servation: Report to the New England Energy Congress,
February, 1979.
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affect single family homes.
Within each category, homes are further differen-
tiated. The single family category contains a set of pro-
totypical units described by structural characteristics
(wall area, floor area, number of stories, etc.). Those
characteristics tend to be similar for houses of the same
age group using the same fuel. The prototypical units are
listed in Table A-1.
By modifying the basic inputs to the model, alterna-
tive weatherization levels can be simulated. For example,
the results of an investment in insulation can be shown by
changing the thermal characteristics of a prototypical
unit. Given the wall an R-value of R-9 rather than R-0
and computing the change in-energy demanded, gives the
energy savings or "return" on an investment in fiberglass
batting for wall insulation.
The initial conditions, or description of the current
weatherization of the housing stock, is the most sensitive
part of the model since it provides the meter against
which to measure change in energy demand. Richard Daifuku,2
the creator of REFORM, developed a set of initial condi-
tions for the New England housing stock which was modified
2Richard Daifuku's original two papers presenting REFORM
are listed in the bibliography and should be consulted for
a more detailed description of the model.
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TABLE A-i
Prototypical Units Simulated in REFORM
Single Family Detached Dwellings
Fuel Type
Fossil
Electric
n.a. not applicable
Year of
Construction
pre 1940
pre 1940
1940-1965
1965-1979
1965-1979
Insulation
Uninsulated
Insulated
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
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by the Massachusetts Audubon Society from the results of
3
a survey. This thesis modifies those assumptions in
turn when necessary to develop a characterization of the
Martha's Vineyard housing stock and tailor the model to
Vineyard materials, labor and energy costs.
Information from a questionnaire distributed by ERG
supplies much of the data specific to the Island. Twelve
hundred questionnaires were distributed to a random sam-
pling of approximately ten percent of the names in the
Island telephone directory. About one-third of those sam-
pled responded to the mail survey.
Conversations with Vineyard Commission staff, insula-
tion installers, construction workers, assessors, and
architects also provided information.4
Al.1 Data and Assumptions in the Model
Daifuku used census data on new construction and the
results of a survey to build his description of the hous-
ing stock. He relied on an "exhaustive" literature search
of the construction characteristics of the present housing
3 NERCOM, op. cit., Appendix A.
4
Vicky DeStephano, Michael Wild, and Douglas Ewing, all of
the Martha's Vineyard Commission staff, provided informa-
tion. A number of insulation installers, construction
material suppliers, and contractors on the Island were con-
sulted. Although none of-these conversations were strictly
confidential, to identify individuals might inadvertantly
affect the competitive position of a particular business.
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stock. From the 1975 census report that 70 percent of all
new housing in the Northeast are frame construction and
historical data, he assumed all housing was frame. By in-
spection it can be determined that this is also a good
assumption for the Vineyard.
The 1970 census showed that the average house is 1.76
stories and that 90.7% have basements which are unheated.
Daifuku derived a prototypical single family dwelling from
these statistics-a two story frame structure having an
unheated basement.
The year-round dwellings on the Vineyard are usually
two-story and have unheated basements. Only the newer
homes that are pre-fabricated or slab construction differ
considerably from this description. However, they are not
usually year-round dwellings. The calculations for energy
savings are based only on year round dwellings or about
forty percent of the units. 5
The structural characteristics of each of the cate-
gories of single family dwellings are shown in Table A-2.
On average, the structural characteristics of year round
dwellings on the Island are not inconsistent with the ori-
5 The Martha's Vineyard Commission Water Quality Management
Plan of 1977 shows 40% of all Island homes as year round
dwellings.
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TABLE A-2
Design Parameters for Single-Family
Detached Structure
Pre- 1940 Post-
1940 -65 1965
Width x length xheight, ft 20 x 30 x18 21x 31x18 23 x 35 x18
22Floor-ceiling area, ft2 1200 1302 1610
Gross wall, ft2  1800 1872 2088
Glazing (% of floor area) 12 12 15
Glass area, ft 2  144 156 242
Sash crack length, ft 182 198 307
Frame crack length, ft 154 166 258
Door area, ft2 40 40 40
Door crack length, ft 39 39 39
Net wall, ft 2  1616 1676 1806
Roof area, ft 2  662 718 888
End walls of attic, ft 2  93 103 123
Area of basemt windows, ft 2  12 13 16
Gross area basemt wall, ft2 700 728 812
Net wall above grade, ft2 163 169 187
Wall below grade, ft 2  525 546 609
Residential Space Heatingand Cooling in New England _1972-
2000, Richard Daifuku, December 1976, Brookhaven National
Laboratory.
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ginal model specifications.6 However, there are unique
structures among the older Vineyard homes in particular.
The model will not adequately represent them and calcula-
tion of total energy savings Vineyard-wide may be biased.
It is difficult to tell the direction of the bias since
the struc':ures are unique. But the effect is not likely
to be large since most year round houses are similar to
the prototypical dwellings.
The total number of dwelling units was calculated
from the report of the 1970 U.S. census and a survey of
records of the six Island towns. The census shows 5510
dwelling units in 1970. Of these, 2869 are year round.
Table A-3 is a breakdown of year round dwellings by year
of construction also from the census. Table A-4 lists the
currently reported number of dwelling units by town. The
total number of homes is 7924. Therefore, 2414 were built
between 1970 and 1979; total year-round-dwellings are
1325.
The model is sensitive to the other three character-
istics used to describe the current housing stock-the
fuel mix, the amount of existing insulation, and the rela-
tionship of these two characteristics to the age of the
6 The town assessors and Vicky DeStephano of the M.V. Com-
mission were consulted to determine the structural charac-
teristics of year round Vineyard dwellings.
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TABLE A-3
Year Round Dwelling Units-Dukes County, MA
Year Built
1965-March 1970
1960-1964
1950-1959
1940-1949
1939 or earlier
Total
Units
277
224
478
248
1642
2869
*
U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970.
TABLE A-4
Number of Dwelling Units by Town
**
NumberTown
Tisbury
Oak Bluffs
Edgartown
West Tisbury
Chilmark
Gay Head
Total
1568
2263
2242
700
876
274
7924
**
Information provided by assessor, building inspector,
or planning office of each town-June 1980.
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dwelling. To determine how sensitive the results are to
different assumptions about these characteristics, two
base cases were developed. Case A follows the assumptions
Daifuku used to specify the basic case for the New England
housing stock and applies them to data for Martha's Vine-
yard. Case B draws on the results of ERG's survey to
create a different set of initial conditions.
Al.2 Description of Cases
Al.2.1 Case A
Daifuku consulted the census to determine the fuel
mix of the structures existing as of 1970. Two hundred
and seventy-four units on the Island were heated by elec-
tricity at that time. REFORM requires the correspondence
between age and fuel type to specify the prototypical
dwelling units. However, the census does not provide that
data. Also, REFORM only calculates energy under this li-
mitation savings for the categories shown in Table A-2.
Only homes built in 1965 or later can be heated electri-
cally. Therefore,,all of the 274 electrically heated
homes reported in the 1970 census are assumed to be built
between 1965 and 1970.
In addition, Daifuku assumes that thirty percent of
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the units built after 1970 use electric heat. As a re-
sult, the total number of electrically heated units is 564
or 45 percent of the housing stock. The rest are heated
by fossil fuels.
REFORM calculates energy savings from new investments
in weatherstripping, storm doors and windows, and insula-
tion. Unfortunately, data on the current weatherization
of dwelling units are scarce. A 1974 report by Petersen8
served as a basis for Daifuku's assumption that 90 percent
of the homes built prior to 1940 have walls insulated to
R-8 and 10 percent are uninsulated. However, the Massa-
chusetts Audubon Society found in its survey of New Eng-
land homes that only 26 percent of all pre-1940 units were
insulated.
9
The Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies sur-
veyed buildings nationally to determine the percent of
single family homes with insulation. These were the data
J Lee,'Energy Supply and Demand in the Northeast United
States, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Upton, NY, 1976.
8 This information is from a study by S.R. Petersen, Retro-
fitting Existing Housing for Energy Conservation; An Eco-
nomic Analysis, National Bureau of Standards Building Sci-
ence Series 64, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington,
DC, 1974.
9 Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies' Lifestyles
and Energy Surveys-quoted in: Newman, O.K. and Day, D.,
The American Energy Consumer, Ballinger Publishing Co.,
Cambridge,. MA, 1975, p. 38.
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Daifuku originally used to establish the insulation char-
acteristics of the rest of the base case. Massachusetts
Audubon's survey again showed different results. The
Massachusetts Audubon's data are used in Case A calcula-
tions since it is likely that the Martha's Vineyard hous-
ing is more similar to the rest of New England's than to
a national amalgam.
The Case A base case is shown in Table A-5.
Al.2.2 Case B
The Energy Resource Group's survey of Island resi-
dents showed 17 percent of the year round houses were
heated electrically. Although survey respondents indi-
cated exactly what type of fuel was used, REFORM does not
differentiate among oil, propane, wood and solar. In its
calculations, all of the houses using these fuels are con-
sidered to be heated by fossil fuels.
ERG's data do not easily fit the specifications used
to describe the REFORM base case. The survey revealed
that 71 percent of the year round dwellings have been wea-
therstripped, 80 percent have complete storm windows, and
47 percent are well insulated. There is no differentia-
tion by age of structure nor is it clear what "well" ver-
sus "adequate" insulation means in terms of the R-values
used in REFORM. Based on the response to the questions
on storm windows and airleaks shown in Table A-6, and on
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TABLE A-5
Composition of Housing Stock-Case A
Type of Dwelling Unit
pre 1940 U
pre 1940 I
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979 E
Number of Units
1215
427
950
679
564
Initial Conditions-Weatherization Level Zero
Walls
[R-
Value]
pre 1940 U
pre 1940 I
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979 E
0
11
3
7
7
Ceil-
ing
[R-
Value]
0
9
7
12
15
Wea-
Storm ther-
Win- Storm strip-
Floors
[R-
Value]
0
0
0
0
0
dows
[% of
Unit]
70
70
65
45
60
Door
[% of
Unit]
70
70
65
50
60
ping
[% of
Unit]
25
25
25
25
30
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TABLE A-6
Energy Resource Group Survey Response-
Year Round Owner Occupied Dwellings
1. Are your windows, doors and building shell tightly
sealed to prevent air leaks?
Yes
No
Don't know
71.43 %
25.00
3.57
2. Does your home have storm (or double) windows?
Yes
Only some
No
3. In your opinion, how is your home insulated?
Well
Adequately
Poorly
Not at all
Don't know
81.66 %
6.55
11.79
47.14 %
36.12
11.45
3.52
1.76
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the description of the results of the first level- of in-
vestment (Table A-7), the initial condition for 70 percent
of all dwellings is REFORM level one. Some of the units
may be weatherized-"well" insulated, all storm windows,
and no air leaks. Twenty percent of all homes are assumed
to currently be weatherized to level three. Because the
Massachusetts Audubon case reflects a survey of New Eng-
land homes and some ERG survey responses were no insula-
tion, no storm windows, and no weatherstripping, ten per-
cent of the homes on Martha's Vineyard are assumed to be
described by the same characteristics as the Case A ini-
tial conditi:ons.
The 70 percent level one, 20 percent level three,
10 percent base assumption was modified slightly for
dwellings constructed prior to 1940. REFORM has two sets
of specifications for pre-1940 dwellings. One describes
the results of investments for the initially uninsulated
dwellings and the other describes energy savings for the
insulated units. In Case A, these were 26 percent and 74
percent respectively of the pre-1940 units. For Case B,
70 percent are assumed to be level three of the uninsu-
lated units. Thirty percent are assumed to have walls
insulated to R-8 and ten percent are completely uninsu-
lated.
The initial conditions for Case B are shown in Table
A-8.
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TABLE A-7
*
Weatherization Levels in REFORM
Type of
Structure
Walls
[R-
Value]
Level 1
pre-1940 I
pre-1940 U
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979 E
Level 2
pre-1940 I
pre-1940 U
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979 E
Level 3
pre-1940 I
pre-1940 U
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979 E
Level 4
pre-1940 I
pre-1940 U
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979 E
Ideal
pre-1940 I
pre-1940 U
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979 E
11
0
3
7
11
0
3
7
7
11
0
3
7
11
0
7
11
11
11
11
11
Ceil-
ing
[R-
Value]
9
0
7
19
15
19
19
10
12
15
19
19
7
19
15
19
19
7
19
15
38
38
38
38
38
Floors
[R-
Value
0
0
0
0
0
19
0
0
19
19
19
0
19
19
19
19
19
0
19
19
19
19
19
19
19
Residential Energy Conservation: Report to
Energy Congress, February 1979, New England
sion.
the New England
Regional Commis-
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Storm
Win-
dows
[% of
Unit]
100
100
100
45
60
100
70
100
45
60
100
100
100
45
60
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
Storm
Door
[.% of
Unit]
90
90
90
50-
60
70
90
65
50
60
70
70
90
50
60
90
90
65
50
60
100
100
100
100
100
Wea-
ther-
strip-
ping
[% of
Units]
100
100
100
25
30
100
25
100
25
30
100
100
100
25
30
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
TABLE A-8
Composition of Housing Stock-Case B
Type of
Dwelling Unit
pre-1940 U
pre-1940 U
pre-1940 I
1940-1965
1965-1979 F
1965-1979E
Number
of Units
Level of .
Weatherization
0
3
0
0
1
3
0
1
3
0
1
3
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165
1149
328
177
618
88
206
723
103
21
148
42
Al.3 Calculations
With the thermal integrity and the structural char-
acteristics defined, it is straightforward to calculate
the energy requirement for a given unit. Daifuku origi-
nally computed unit demand in 1977. Massachusetts Audubon
recalculated the demands in 1978. This thesis uses the
adjusted calculations.
To compute the energy savings, the efficiencies of
the heating systems must be specified. The electrical
systems are assumed to be 95.percent efficient, and oil
furnaces 50 percent efficient.
Vineyard energy and weatherization prices were ob-
tained from the suppliers on the Island. Number two heat-
ing oil is $1.00/136,000 BTUs or about $1.00 per gallon.
Electricity costs $.08/KWH. The prices of insulation,
weatherstripping, and storm doors and windows are listed
in Table A-9.
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TABLE A-9
Prices of Materials and Labor
Fiberglass Batts (Ceilings and Floors)
Materials
R-ll $.21/sq.ft.
R-19 $.33/sq.ft.
R-30 $.45/sq.ft.
Labor 125% of materials cost
Cellulite Foam (Walls)
$.80/sq.ft.
Storm Windows
Materials $6/unit
Labor + Overhead $24/unit
Storm Doors
Materials $76/unit
Labor $49/unit
Weatherstripping
Materials $.15/linear ft.
Labor $10.00/window or door
Based on interviews with businessmen, weatherization wor-
kers, and insulation suppliers, Summer 1980, Martha's
Vineyard.
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APPENDIX II
Results from the Model
A2.1 Case A: Initial Conditions-New England Housing
Stock Characteristics
Table A2-l shows the annual energy savings from each
level of investment for each prototypical dwelling. Fig-
ure 1 is a plot of the number of years necessary to recoup
the investments. All except one are recoverable in four
years or less. Most average less than two.
If the choices facing the rational consumer are being
modeled by the investment level, and if diminishing re-
turns occur in weatherization as in other investments, the
specific actions for the first level of investment (lowest
budget constraint) should have the highest return. The
highest return should also have the shortest payback. Or,
the plots of payback period versus investment level in
Figure 1 should slope upward from left to right and then
flatten for each type of dwelling.
A2.1.1 Analysis of Investment Results using Payback Period
1940-1965 Units:
For homes built between 1940 and 1965, Figure 1 shows
the declining marginal returns that are expected. The
initial insulation tends to have a greater effect on re-
ducing unit demand than additional insulation in the same
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TABLE A2-l
Weather-
zation,
Cost [$1
Energy
Saved
per Unit
[MBTUs]
Annual
Savings
per Unit
[$1.00/
136,000
BTUs]
pre-1940 Uninsulated
Level 1
2
3
4
Ideal
pre-1940 Insulated
Level 1
2
3
4
Ideal
1940-1965
Level 1
2
3
4
Ideal
1965-present Fossil
Level 1
2
3
4
Ideal
1965-present Electric
Level 1
2
3
4
Ideal
Cost is amount required to
tion to indicated level.
weatherize from initial condi-
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Pay-
back
[years]
248
496
544
1139
3050
248
444
889
939
1306
291
468
775
1318
2558
25.2
52.6
76.8
98.0
196.2
25.2
35.2
54.6
55.6
62.4
29.4
43.6
33.0
47.0
92.4
7.8
26.2
34.0
70.2
89.2
185
388
565
721
1443
185
259
401
409
459
216
320
243
345
679
57
193
250
516
656
109
306
414
750
901
1.34
1.28
1.14
1.58
2.11
1.34
1.71
2.22
2.30
2.85
1.35
1.46
3.19
3.82
3.77
4.05
3.10
3.31
2.44
3.95
5.57
1.95
2.91
2.08
2.65
231
598
828
1260
2590
607
598
1205
1561
2390
41.3
13.1
17.7
32.0
38.4
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area of the house. Raising the R-value of a wall, from R-0
to R-7 will cause a proportionately greater reduction in
unit demand than raising the value from R-7 to R-14. Es-
sentially, this graph does show diminishing marginal re-
turns (or increasing payback period) to weatherization in-
vestments.
1965-1979 Units:
The payback graphs for homes built between 1965 and
the present do not clearly reflect diminishing marginal
returns. In fact, investment level one has a longer pay-
back than level two, particularly for the electrically
heated home. Even so, this can be explained as an effect
of diminishing returns.
The specific purchases in each level of investment
were originally chosen to correspond to budgets of $250,
$500, $1,000, $1,500, and unconstrained.10 Level one was
about half as expensive as level two. Now, both invest-
ments involve approximately the same outlay but the return.
to level two is greater (payback period shorter). The
investment from the initial condition to level one raises
the R-value of the walls from R-7 to R-ll for the electri-
cally heated home and the R-value of the ceiling from R-12
10The levels of investment and the actions taken in each
were determined by Massachusetts Audubon Society for
their report to the New England Energy Congress, 1979.
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to R-19 for the fossil fueled dwelling. Both of these in-
vestments are additions to a relatively substantial amount
of existing insulation. The weatherization from the ini-
tial conditions to level two changes the R-value of floor
insulation in both structures from R-0 to R-19. The
floors were completely uninsulated and this new insulation
decreased unit demand by more than the additional wall or
ceiling insulation. Although diminishing returns are not
a result of an increase in total spending on weatheriza-
tion for level two versus level one, dimishing returns are
still evident in the results of increased outlay for one
aspect of weatherization.
The longer payback period for level three (versus
level two) is an indication- of both decreasing returns
with overall investment increasing, and the diminishing
returns for the same expenditures as level one. The drop
back to a shorter payback for level four is again repre-
senting an investment in an area where there was no pre-
vious weatherization (storm windows and weatherstripping).
Although the amount spent is greater, the increase repre-
sents storm windows and weatherstripping where there was
none. Rather than adding another layer of weatherstripping
over an existing one or covering a window with a second
storm window, level four is "new" weatherization. The
payback period for level five is long because it is the
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greatest initial outlay and because all of the aspects of
weatherization are exhibiting diminishing returns.
Pre-1940 Units:
Units that were initially insulated show a clearly
defined trend of diminishing returns to increasing wea-
therization. These homes are fairly well insulated, wea-
therstripped, and have storm windows. Although additional
weatherization does increase energy savings, the increase
in savings is less than proportional to the increased in-
vestment, i.e., payback period lengthens.
The uninsulated structures do not begin to show di-
minishing returns until level four. Insulating the ceil-
ing, storm doors and windows, and weatherstripping all
save proportionally more energy than the increase in in-
vestment. However, floor insulation, wall insulation, and
additional celing insulation have a diminishing marginal
return.
A2.1.2 Critique of Model and Payback Analysis
REFORM does not compute the energy savings from a
full menu of possible conservation methods. Also, the
higher levels of investment do not always include the same
actions as the lesser amounts. The definition of marginal
return to an additional dollar of investment is unclear
when spending more does not include the same purchases and
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when the choice of possible investments is constrained.
This is part of the reason why the graphs do not always
have the expected shape. It appears that the selection of
actions in each level of investment did not assume that
consumers will choose the options on the basis of rate of
return. Either, there was no consideration of what would
be the "best" investment under each budget constraint or
relative prices have changed enough to change the ranking
of actions by return.
A2.l.3 Rate of Return Analysis
By manipulating the calculations for each investment
level, it is possible to determine the rates of return for
some of the actions. Table A2-2 shows these costs, energy
savings, and rates of return. There is a fairly clear
picture of diminishing marginal returns except in instances
where a relatively inexpensive addition to existing insu-
lation has a lower return than a costlier form of new wea-
therization. An example is 5230 of increased ceiling in-
sulation for fossil fuel heated homes built since 1965
having a lower return than $432 spent to put up storm win-
dows and weatherstripping. This seeming violation of di-
minishing returns arises because the menu of possible wea-
therization investments is still incomplete. The ideal
set of.energy savings and cost calculations would show the
cost of each marginal reduction on energy consumed for
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TABLE A2-2
*
Savings from Measures--Disaggregated
A from
Initial
~ Condi-
tions
(except
where
noted)
Savings
MBTUs $
1965-1979 Electric
Ceiling &
Storm Doors
Walls
Floor
Storm Windows &
Weatherstripping
1965-1979 Fossil
Ceiling &
Storm Doors
Ceiling
Floor
Storm Windows &
Weatherstripping
1940-1965
Walls
Floor
Ceiling &
Storm Door
Ceiling
Storm Windows,
Doors & Weather-
stripping
829
607
598
356
953
230
598
432
1089
483
249
291
R-23,40 %
R-4
R-19
40%, 70%
R-26 , 50%
R-7
R-19
55%, 75%
R-8
R-19
R-12 25% to
to R-31,35%
R-12
35%, 25%
75%
6.42 151
4.63 108
13.05 306
14.32 336
19.0
7.8
26.2
36.2
21.8
17.6
9.4
14.2
29.4
140
57
193
266
160
129
173
104
216
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Cost
[$1
Return
on In-
vest-
ment
in One
Year
18
18
51
94
15
25
32
62
15
39
39
42
74
TABLE A2-2 (Cont.)
Savings
MBTUs $
pre-1940 Insulated
Storm Door
Floor
Ceiling
Storm Windows &
Weatherstripping
50
446
245
198
20%
R-19
R-10
30%, 75%
1.0
19.4
11.0
24.2
7 15
143
81
178
pre-1940 Uninsulated
Storm Windows &
Weatherstripping
Floor
Ceiling
Walls, Ceiling,
Storm Doors
Storm Doors
198
446
446
1911
50
30%, 75%
R-19
R-19
R-ll,
R-19 to R-38
20% to 30%
20%
.25 4
10.35 152
26.05 383
49.10 722
12.35 182
*
There may appear to be violations of the law of diminish-
ing marginal returns because some measures cannot be dis-
aggregated and because less costly investments may be ad-
ditions to existing insulation.
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A from
Initial
Condi-
tions
(except
where
noted)
Cost
[$1
Return
on In-
vest-
ment
in One
Year
32
33
90
7
34
36
38
92
each form of weatherization. The consumer would Ynow that
the first $50 spent on storm windows caused a certain
energy savings versus $50 spent on weatherstripping. The
next $50 spent on those same items would also generate
energy savings but maybe slightly less. In the case where
spending less than a certain amount is not useful (spend-
ing $50 on wall insulation probably makes no sense since
for it to have any effect probably requires insulating
more than 58 square feet of wall), the return is zero for
less than that minimum expenditure. With a table showing
the energy savings and cost of each measure, the choices
of a consumer using cost effectiveness as a decision rule
can be determined.
Even with the limitations of the model, it is clear
that the paybacks are short and the rates of return high
for investments in weatherization. When similar calcula-
tions were performed in 1978 for all the New England
states, paybacks averaged five years. In large part this
reflects the rapidly rising cost of energy. For instance,
the 1978 cost per million Btu of oil was $3.70. Now it is
$7.35. Labor and material costs of weatherization have
not inflated nearly as quickly so the investments have be-
come more attractive.
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A2.2 Case B: Initial Conditions-Martha's Vineyard Hous-
ing Stock Characteristics
Payback periods for investments to bring the housing
stock from Case B initial conditions to the ideal are be-
tween 2 and 5 years. The better insulated homes have a
longer payback to the investment in general which is ex-
pected given diminishing marginal returns. If Case B is
a more accurate description of the housing stock, then it
is less surprising that consumers are not demanding wea-
therization services. However, the estimated benefits
are still substantial and rising energy prices are likely
to reduce the actual payback.
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TABLE A2-3
Case B Results
Type of
Dwelling
1965-1979 E
1965-1979 F
1940-1965
pre-1940 U
pre-1940 I
Ini-
tial
Condi-
tion
0
1
3
0
1
3
0
1
3
0
3
0
Cost
to
Ideal
$2390
1782
1185
2590
2266
1668
2558
2267
1783
3050
1960
1191
Annual
Savings
$901
792
485
656
578
406
692
463
334
1442
878
459
Years
to
Pay-
back
2.65
2.25
2.44
3.95
3.79
4.11
3.70
4.90
5.34
2.12
2.23
2.59
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APPENDIX III
Energy Balance for Martha's Vineyard
An energy balance showing all inflows and outflows of
energy in the Vineyard economy was constructed from infor-
mation of dealers and suppliers. It also shows oil as
providing more than 90% of the heat.
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TABLE A3-l
Energy Balance
Percentage of Fuel Consumed
Fuel
Diesel
Wood
Gasoline
Electri-
city
Oil
Propane
Annual
Island
Usage
.5 M
gals.
2889
cords
5 M
gals.
65810
MWM
6 M
gals.
12000
tanks
(284,000
gals.)
BTUs
[106]
7,000
72,225
600,000
224,610
871,140
19,655
Residential
x o(n)t mn
CD (tO0 w (D
W. yO0rt w.
rt (D V(D C12
I-HIi 0o e o o
1.00
.24
75
.06
.36 .10
4 -4.24-
.14
Com-
mer-
cial
1.00
.25
.80
Transportation
S -0 r
U) CC 0
.09 | .01 .90
Government
0rt C 0
(D 0 .
h- 0 P
Ht
w
.04
.05
.02
by Use
co
.
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